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Abstract
There is a growing body of literature which suggests that voting patterns are not
independent from space yet few empirical investigations exist which take explicit
account of space. This article examines the determinants of voting patterns across
constituencies in England and Wales using spatial econometric methods. The
results suggest that while socioeconomic factors are key determinants of party vote
shares in constituencies, there is strong spatial autocorrelation in voting patterns.
We find that each major political party is influenced by space to different extents
with the Liberal Democrats visibly exploiting spatial autocorrelation to increase
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21. Introduction
There is a growing body of literature which suggests that voting patterns are not independent
from space. Some scholars claim that voting is a learned activity which takes place in a number
of different contexts and through a range of mechanisms at a variety of different scales (COX,
1969; TAYLOR and JOHNSTON, 1978; JOHNSTON et al., 2005b). Such contextual effects
complement compositional effects and can result from people interacting with their material
environment, social networks or political parties through, for example, place-specific
campaigns (JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 2006). These processes occur in places, making it
unsurprising that there is an increasing amount of empirical evidence supporting the
proposition that spatial variations in voting patterns exist.
With socio-economic and demographic information for areas easily obtainable from the UK
Census, it is unsurprising that the majority of aggregate analyses of voting patterns in the UK
are conducted at the constituency scale. However, few aggregate analyses that employ
regression techniques to analyse party support explicitly take account of spatial effects. The
purpose of this paper is threefold: first we discuss the consequences of failing to account of
these spatial effects in aggregate models of party support in the 2005 general election in
England and Wales, then we demonstrate how regression models can take account of spatial
effects, and finally we present evidence that ignoring spatial effects may well bias results.
This paper has the following structure. In the next section we review the theoretical literature
which suggests that there is a geographical element to voting in the United Kingdom. Then, in
Section 3, we hypothesise the relationships between the variables discussed in the theoretical
section and discuss reasons why we should take space into account. In Section 4 we present
geographical evidence which indicates that there are clusters of areas which appear to have
high vote shares for a specific party. Such spatial heterogeneity and autocorrelation should be
considered when empiricists attempt to investigate the drivers of vote shares and patterns of
political support. The spatial regression technique and the results of our econometric
estimations are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Geography of Voting in Great Britain
A growing body of literature has repeatedly illustrated that there are spatial patterns of voting
above those that reflect compositional effects (JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 2006). Central to
this argument is that voting is a learned activity which takes place in a number of different
contexts and through a range of mechanisms at a variety of different scales. These contextual
effects complement compositional effects and result from, for example, people interacting with
their material environment, with others in social networks or from political parties interacting
with people during place-specific campaigns (CUTTS, 2006a). Accordingly there is a large and
increasingly empirical literature emphasising the existence and intensity of spatial variations
vote shares.
Much scholarly attention has focused on variations in voting across regions (JOHNSTON et
al., 1988). There have been long standing inter-regional variations in Great Britain’s voting
patterns (FIELD, 1997) with evidence of a ‘north-south’ divide: Labour dominating the
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much stronger support in the southern regions (JOHNSTON et al., 1988; CURTICE and
STEED, 1982). These differences were accentuated during the 1980s with intra- and inter-
regional variations in urban-rural differences: Labour became increasingly popular in major
cities while the Conservatives dominated in suburban areas, rural towns and villages. The
Conservatives reaped electoral support from all classes in southern regions (areas of relative
economic prosperity following the growth of the service sector) while it saw a relative decline
in support across all classes in northern regions and South Wales (areas of relative economic
depression following the closure of primary and traditional manufacturing industries).
However, since 1987, there is evidence that inter-regional differences have closed (CURTICE
and PARK, 2000; JOHNSTON et al., 2005a) with evolving economic forces only partly
explaining this reversal. During the 1990s, the rise of ‘new Labour’ altered voters’ perceptions.
By presenting itself as a ‘catch-all party’, capable of strong government and leadership,
together with an economic strategy that promoted rather than penalised affluent workers in the
southern regions, Labour successfully appealed directly to particular types of people in
particular types of area which led to less pronounced inter-regional differences (HEATH et al.,
2001; JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 2006).
Even though these differences remain apparent, there is still uncertainty about why differences
exist and whether such regional variations are ‘real’ (JOHNSTON et al., 2005a). Regional
variations may reflect differences in political cultures. As similar types of people become
socialised into local attitudes and values, regional differences in voting patterns can occur.
During the 1980s, inter-regional differences may have reflected changing inter-constituency
population characteristics as a result of inter-regional migration and economic restructuring
(CURTICE and STEED, 1982). More recently, some scholars have claimed that people vote
according to their perceptions of national and personal economic circumstances, and that such
perceptions are spatially, in particular regionally, variable (JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 1997,
1998). However, this has been contested by claims that people behave in a similar manner in
different regions according to their individual characteristics, thereby ruling out any substantial
regional effect on voting (MCALLISTER and STUDLAR, 1992). Other studies have reached
different conclusions regarding explanations of regional differences (JOHNSTON and
PATTIE, 1998; RUSSELL, 1997).
While the most recent general elections have seen regional variations remain largely constant,
inter-constituency variations in party support have become ever more apparent (JOHNSTON
and PATTIE, 2006). The constituency scale has long been the dominant feature of Great
Britain’s electoral geography with the majority of aggregate analyses occurring at this level
because of the paucity of data at smaller geographical levels. At this scale, early studies
provided circumstantial evidence that similar people vote differently in different types of
places (COX, 1969; CREWE and PAYNE, 1971). Using a combination of constituency and
British Electoral Studies (BES) survey data, BUTLER and STOKES (1969, 1974) put forward
arguments consistent with classic neighbourhood effects in their pioneering work on British
electoral behaviour: in strong Labour and Conservative areas there was pressure in the local
milieu for electors to remain with the local majority view. These arguments were developed by
MILLER (1977, 1978), who claimed that class polarisation was greater at the constituency
context than the individual level. He accounted for this spatial polarisation by associating these
observed patterns with neighbourhood effects, specifically the role of the environment in
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members of an area’s minority class is likely to convert these people to the dominant
viewpoint. Without any evidence that such processes operated, these findings were not immune
from criticism (DUNLEAVY, 1979; 1980), despite further evidence that socio-demographic
composition could not account for party support at the constituency level (JOHNSTON et al.,
1988). By combining constituency level data to individual respondent’s information from the
BES over the period 1964-97, a later study showed significant across-constituency variation in
Labour and Conservative support and stressed both the influence of social interaction
(supporting the neighbourhood hypothesis put forward by MILLER) and variations in the
marginality of the electoral contest on voting patterns (ANDERSEN and HEATH, 2002).
Other studies of inter-constituency variations in party support have focused on party activity
rather than socio-demographic composition. To reap electoral rewards, parties campaign
differentially across constituencies, focusing their activity in marginal seats. While it is
important for parties in marginal seats to win over new voters or shift established voting
intentions, it is also vital for them to identify and then mobilise supporters thus ensuring they
vote on election day. Over the last two decades, numerous studies have found that where a
party campaigned more intensively, relative to its opponents, the greater its electoral payoff
(JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 1995; DENVER and HANDS, 1997; FIELDHOUSE and CUTTS,
forthcoming). There is also evidence that parties through sophisticated local targeting strategies
and grassroots campaigning now successfully operate at much smaller spatial electoral scales
(below the constituency level) in order to maximise their potential rewards (CUTTS, 2006b).
In recent times, attempts to identify the ‘real’ spatial variations in voting at British general
elections have focused on smaller geographical scales. For instance, innovative research saw
the use of ‘bespoke neighbourhoods’1 with convincing evidence of small scale spatial
variations in voting (JOHNSTON et al., 2000; 2001; 2004; 2007). People from similar social
backgrounds were found to vote differently depending on their local context, and these
neighbourhood effects operated at a variety of scales nesting within each other (JOHNSTON
and PATTIE, 2006). Later research using the British Household Panel Survey also found that
voting decisions were affected by interaction with neighbours and friends, and contact with
party activists in various settings (JOHNSTON et al., 2005b).
‘The more people had contact with their neighbours the more likely they were to
vote as there neighbours did, according to the neighbourhood characteristics that
they shared’ (JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 2006, p104).
Other evidence stressed the importance of smaller spatial scales on voter participation
(FIELDHOUSE and CUTTS, 2007), while similar sophisticated models of voting seem to
show that, contrary to earlier findings, inter-regional variations in voting patterns are no more
than aggregation effects as any geography to voting operates at much smaller spatial scales
(JOHNSTON et al., 2007).
1 See JOHNSTON and PATTIE (2006) for a detailed explanation of how bespoke neighbourhoods are constructed
and an overview of their use in a number of recent studies.
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intrinsically spatial, at scales ranging from the locale to the regional. Given this, it is
paramount that explanatory statistical models of voting take account of possible spatial effects.
Despite recent innovations, there is no official general election voting data at any smaller areas
below that of the parliamentary constituency. With socio-economic and demographic
information for areas easily obtainable from the census, it is unsurprising that the majority
(although not all as shown above) of aggregate analyses are conducted at the constituency scale
but it is surprising that few aggregate analyses that employ regression techniques to analyse
party support take account of spatial heterogeneity. We fill this gap in the literature.
3. Understanding Patterns of Party Support in 2005
To examine what factors shaped the underlying pattern of party support in 2005 we use linear
regression models of party vote share in the 2005 general election. Our initial models include
socio-demographic factors and the local political context to explain the types of area in which
each party did better or worse.
Our vote share linear regression models are built over two stages to reflect a number of well
established arguments. This approach also enhances clarity by showing how variables in the
model are affected by the inclusion of others. First we include social cleavage variables to
reflect the fact that they are relatively stable and exogenous. Parties tend to do better in areas
with large numbers of the social groups who tend to support that party. The importance of
social cleavages on voting behaviour has long been established – at the ecological level, parties
often perform well or do badly in areas depending on the people that live there (CUTTS,
2006b). While both Labour and the Conservatives have strong electoral foundations based on
social cleavages, the Liberal Democrats have been found to lack a similar solid social base
(CREWE and KING, 1995; CURTICE, 1996). Nonetheless, there is some evidence that
Liberal Democrat voters tend to be more middle class, highly educated and likely to work in
the public sector (RUSSELL and FIELDHOUSE, 2005). Yet, evidence from the 2005 BES
suggests that there are no socio-demographic groups that can be considered part of the Liberal
Democrats natural heartland, with the party only doing best amongst those highly educated
individuals with degrees (FIELDHOUSE et al., 2006).
We employ nine variables taken from the 2001 census that reflect the main socio-economic
correlates of variations in voting behaviour in Great Britain, many of which have been used in
aggregate analyses examining voting patterns in recent general elections (JOHNSTON et al.,
1998; RUSSELL and FIELDHOUSE, 2005; FIELDHOUSE et al., 2006). In 2005, Labour
was expected to lose support in predominantly Muslim and student areas to the Liberal
Democrats, given the Liberal Democrats’ opposition to tuition fees and the War in Iraq. We
include three census variables to ascertain whether the Liberal Democrats did perform better
and Labour did worse in areas with large numbers of students, workers in education and
constituencies with large Muslim electorates.
At the second stage of the model we include reported party campaign spending to reflect the
intensity of local party activism. Since the 1950s, the impact of local party activism on party
support has been contested (BUTLER and STOKES, 1969). However since the mid 1990s, a
growing body of literature has repeatedly demonstrated the electoral benefits of intense
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DENVER and HANDS, 1997), so much so that these originally labelled ‘revisionist’
viewpoints have now become part of the mainstream. However there has been disagreement
over how to best measure campaign effort. Here we use party spending as a surrogate measure
of campaigning. It has been consistently demonstrated that the amount a party spends is
significantly related to its electoral performance: the more a party spends, relative to its
opponents, particularly if it is the challenger, the better the outcome for it (PATTIE et al.,
1995; JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 1995). Moreover, party spending has the advantages of
completeness of coverage and relatively little measurement error, and has proven validity when
measured against alternative measures of campaign intensity (DENVER and HANDS, 1997;
WHITELEY and SEYD, 2003). A recent analysis of campaign effort in the 2005 general
election found that spending was the indicator most highly correlated with the campaign
variable (FIELDHOUSE and CUTTS, 2008, forthcoming). We therefore include party
spending for all three parties to reflect the intensity of local activism. Given previous findings
at recent elections, we would expect local representation and grassroots campaigning to be
particularly salient for the Liberal Democrats than for the other main parties (RUSSELL and
FIELDHOUSE, 2005; CUTTS, 2006a; 2006b).
Although much of the empirical analyses on party vote share in the UK is at the level of the
parliamentary constituency, it appears that such analyses typically do not take into account
either the spatial nature of these parliamentary constituencies – whether one parliamentary
constituency is contiguous to another – or whether the spatial heterogeneity of the dependent
variables has a direct effect on voting patterns. If scholars are to be sure of the effect of socio-
economic correlates then such estimates need to be made once the influence of space has been
taken into account.
Spatial forces
Standard (non-spatial) econometric estimates of the effect of explanatory variables on vote
share will be inefficient if the residuals are spatially autocorrelated. One of the clearest
expositions of the reasons why residuals can be spatially autocorrelated has been provided by
VOSS et al. (2006), and based on the work by WRIGLEY et al. (1996), who emphasise the
importance of, amongst other things, feedback, grouping forces and grouping responses.
VOSS et al. (2006) state the potential for feedback forces to influence individuals and
households preferences and activities. Ceteris paribus, the smaller the spatial scale of analysis
then the greater the potential feedback because of the higher likelihood and frequency of
contact between voters. For reasons related to the adoption/diffusion theory (RODGERS,
1962) and the agent interaction theory (IRWIN and BOCKSTAEL, 2004), we should expect
there to be the potential for spillovers of voting behaviour with a positive correlation in
political party vote shares between contiguous parliamentary constituencies. If a political party
is thought to be positively contributing to the life of voters, then this positive impression of that
political party is likely to be shared with friends and neighbours, including friends and
neighbours within the area and within contiguous areas who interact most with these voters.
Geographically close parliamentary constituencies with similar political party vote shares
might be influenced by grouping forces. Clusters of high vote shares might be due to a number
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party, such as the Liberal Democrats, wishes to spend relatively high amounts on campaigning
in one area then it may well also be wise for that political party to spend relatively high
amounts in that parliamentary constituency’s contiguous constituencies in order to reap the
rewards from spatially autocorrelated coercive political forces.
Of course, this type of coercive political behaviour may well be reacted to in similar fashions
across parliamentary constituencies due to similar socioeconomic backgrounds or political
persuasions of voters. Such grouping responses can be positive or negative and should inform
political parties on the likelihood of campaign spending being effective.
4. Exploratory spatial data analysis
Many scholars have contributed to the theoretical and empirical literatures concerning the
factors that affect party vote shares. However few of these scholars explicitly take account of
geography in their empirical analyses. This is surprising given the political make-up of the
2005 general election constituency map in England and Wales. Labour continues to maintain a
stranglehold of its industrial heartland areas in the North (Greater Manchester, Merseyside,
South and West Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear), large areas of the West and East Midlands and the
traditional industrial areas of South Wales as well as parts of inner city London. By contrast the
Conservatives remain strong in the shire districts of England and suburban areas, particularly
constituencies in the South East and Greater London. In 2005, the Conservatives fell back in
many Northern constituencies and currently have only three seats in Wales and no seats in a
number of major urban centres (Birmingham, Newcastle, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, and
Sheffield). The Liberal Democrats have a distinctive geography of seats based on historical
voting patterns and contemporary advances (RUSSELL and FIELDHOUSE, 2005). Party
strength still lies in the nonconformist ‘Celtic fringe’, specifically the south west of England
and rural parts of Wales. However, since 1992, the Liberal Democrats have captured additional
seats in the south east and London, while in 2005 they achieved electoral breakthroughs in
constituencies where there were both large numbers of students and those working in the
public sector such as education and health (FIELDHOUSE et al., 2006).
As regards the 2005 geography of the vote, Labour continues to do much better in the south,
albeit not as well as four years previously, but still better than 1992. This largely reflects the
success of Labour’s key seats strategy devised in 1997 to target specific marginal seats mainly
in the south east, London and parts of the midlands, and their ability to successfully defend
large numbers of them in the two subsequent general elections. Where the Liberal Democrats
have built ‘electoral credibility’ through local election gains or the stewardship of local
councils, or developed strong local organisations in new types of area (e.g. university seats)
which enhance the party as a credible alternative, the party has managed, often through
intensive local campaigning, to secure increases in support and made parliamentary advances.
Moran’s I scatter plots
One way of examining the geography of voting patterns is to exploit the spatial nature of the
data set. After standardising the variables, we are able to investigate the extent that the party
vote share of each political party in each parliamentary constituency is correlated with the
8party vote share of the same political party in contiguous parliamentary constituencies. Taking
the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives and the Labour parties in turn, this part of the
exploratory data analysis is presented in Figures 1–3.
{Insert Figures 1–3 about here}
In each case the standardised vote share of the political party in 2005 in a parliamentary
constituency is presented on the x-axis, while the y-axis shows the standardised value of the
average political vote share for that party of that parliamentary constituency’s neighbouring
constituency as defined by the queen contiguity weights matrix. [As the data are standardised
the units on the graph are expressed in standard deviations from the mean.] The upper right
quadrant of the Moran’s I scatter plot shows those parliamentary constituencies with an above
average vote share for that political party which shares its boundaries with neighbouring
parliamentary constituencies that also have above average values of the same party’s vote share
(high-high). The bottom left quadrant shows parliamentary constituencies with below average
vote share for a political party with neighbouring parliamentary constituencies also with below
average values (low-low). The bottom right quadrant displays parliamentary constituencies
with above average vote share surrounded by parliamentary constituencies that have below
average vote shares (high-low) and the upper left quadrant showing the opposite. The slope of
the regression line through these points expresses the global Moran’s I value (ANSELIN,
1996).
Figures 1–3 support the notion that there is spatial autocorrelation in voting patterns: in each
case the Moran’s I statistics are positive and statistically significant with values of 0.2956,
0.5975 and 0.5692 for the Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and Labour parties respectively.
Two important extra observations can be made from these ‘global’ figures. First spatial
autocorrelation of party vote share is strongest for the Conservatives and weakest for the
Liberal Democrats. Second, the distribution of points on the scatterplots illustrates different
degrees of heteroskedasticity with the Liberal Democrats fan being particularly explosive; this
indicates that the vote share for this party is localised and targeted, as indicated by the intensity
of points in the low-low quadrant and dispersed points in the high-high quadrant. This is
distinctly different from the Moran’s I scatter plots that are produced from data for the
Conservative and Labour parties, which adds to our intuition that there may be different drivers
of vote shares for different political parties.
Numerous scholars have shown that local party activism has a significant effect on party vote
shares (DENVER and HANDS, 1997; JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 1995; WHITELEY et al.,
1994). Here we use party spending as a surrogate measure of the strength of local campaigning
(JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 1995; FIELDHOUSE and CUTTS, 2008 forthcoming). Given that
party vote shares appear to have an element of spatial autocorrelation, there is an argument that
effective local campaigning should also be spatially autocorrelated. To investigate this issue we
replicate the earlier analysis through the use of Moran’s I scatter plots for data on campaign
spending by each political party, as shown in Figures 4–6. The results support the notion that
there is spatial autocorrelation in party spending: in each case the global Moran’s I statistics are
again positive with values of 0.2646, 0.4530 and 0.2919 for the Liberal Democrats,
Conservatives and Labour parties respectively.
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Three further points concerning these scatter plots are worthy of note. First campaign spending
by the Liberal Democrats is highly targeted, with the majority of points in the low-low
quadrant illustrating lots of parliamentary constituencies where their campaign spending is low
which are also surrounded by parliamentary constituencies where their campaign spending is
also low. Second, the difference between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives is stark.
It appears the Conservatives spend their money in most areas but target specific areas for
relatively low amounts of spending, as illustrated by the sparcity of points in the low-low
quadrant. Third, the two patterns identified above don’t apply to the Labour party. The Labour
party appears to have a relatively even split between the high-high, high-low, low-high and
low-low quadrants. This suggests that campaign spending is not always directly related to local
party performance, an argument we develop later.
LISA cluster maps
An accompaniment to the Moran’s I scatter plot is the LISA cluster map; three such maps are
presented in Figures 7–9 from which we can identify the spatial distribution of high-high, low-
low, high-low and low-high political party spending contiguity patterns across parliamentary
constituencies in England and Wales. In Figures 7–9, areas coloured red represent high
spending in constituencies with high spending in its surrounding constituencies (high-high);
dark blue areas represent patterns of low spending in a constituency with low spending in its
surrounding constituencies (low-low); light blue areas represent low spending in a constituency
with high spending in its surrounding constituencies (low-high); pink areas represent high
spending in a constituency with low spending in its surrounding constituencies (high-low).
{Insert Figures 7–9 about here}
When these three figures are examined together several important points can be made. First,
the Liberal Democrats appear to be more active in parliamentary constituencies that are located
in the South West of England (traditional heartland) and to a much lesser extent in the East
Midlands. The LISA map for the Liberal Democrats appears to be more clearly defined than
for the other two (major) political parties and such positive spatial autocorrelation on party
spending is evidence of knowledge of spatial dependence of voting patterns by this political
party and supports the idea that the Liberal Democrats has a clearly defined local perspective.
Second, it appears that the South West of England is predominantly a two party fight, with
both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives actively contesting seats in this region. By
contrast, the Labour party is spending particularly low levels across this entire region. Third,
Conservative party spending figures suggest that local Conservative party campaigning is
particularly intense in the shire, rural and semi-rural parliamentary constituencies. Dark blue
(low-low) areas are confined to relatively urban parliamentary constituencies for Conservative
party spending patterns. Fourth, the Conservative party spends relatively little in the urban
areas of South Wales, undoubtedly a consequence of Labour’s traditional strength in these
areas. Fifth, Labour party spending appears to be focused in London and along the M62
corridor between Rochdale and Bradford. As noted earlier, this geographical spread reflects the
Labour party’s focus on key target seats, many of which it converted in 1997, and for the most
part has successfully defended in the two subsequent general elections.
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The exploratory evidence presented above clearly indicates the presence of a geographical
element to party vote shares and party spending patterns across England and Wales. If models
are to be estimated and based on a correct functional form then they should be estimated with
geography having an explicit role. In the next section we present estimates of regressions to
identify the impact of geography and party spending on party vote shares. Of particular interest
will be whether there has been any systematic over (or under) estimation of certain socio-
economic covariates in models of vote share if the impact of geography is not accounted for
explicitly in the estimations.
5. Regression Analysis
The purpose of this section is to compare and contrast the results of four regressions for each
political party. To undertake this task we adopt a regression analysis stance and compare and
contrast the results from OLS and spatial regression models. To undertake this task we employ
the GeoDa open source software.2
Spatial regression method
Spatial regression can be used to investigate the influence of spatially evolving relationships.
Two types of regression models are typically employed: the spatial error model and the spatial
lag model. If there were strong theoretical reasoning to believe that the errors of an OLS
regression would be spatially autocorrelated then the appropriate technique is to estimate a
spatial error model, which is commonly specified as follows:
y = X + u (1)
where y represents the dependent variable, X represents the independent variables and the
constant term,  is the regression parameters which are to be estimated and u is the error term.
This error term is presumed to have a covariance structure as given by:
u = Wu +  (2) 
where  is a spatial lag parameter to be estimated, W is a weights matrix defined by the area’s
neighbourhood such that Wu captures the spatial lags of the model’s disturbance term, u, and 
is the independently distributed error term. Elements wij from the W matrix capture the
influence on area i of its neighbours, j. Under this specification spatial autocorrelation in the
dependent variable is the result of exogenous influences captured in the error term and not
directly from the explanatory variables. This typically occurs because the list of explanatory
variables does not contain a variable which captures the spatial autocorrelation that appears in
the dependent variable.
2 This software was developed at the Spatial Analysis Lab at the University of Illinois and can be downloaded for
free from: https://www.geoda.uiuc.edu/
11
It is possible to estimate a model which explicitly captures the spatial autocorrelation. The type
of model which captures spatial autocorrelation as an explanatory variable is a spatial lag
model of the form:
y = Wy + X + u (3)
In this formulation, Wy captures the spatially-weighted average of the dependent variable for
an area’s neighbouring locations and  is the spatial lag parameter to be estimated.
Are space and campaign spending important drivers of party vote share?
First we replicate work which does not explicitly take into account spatial autocorrelation or
campaign spending. We then add each of these variables into the estimations until we end up
with a full model that includes the traditional socio-economic covariates together with both
campaign spending and space. These results are presented in Table 1.
{Insert Table 1 about here}
The table is separated into three distinct sections with each section corresponding to one of the
three major political parties. Four columns of regression results are presented for each political
party. The first column is based on the previous literature which emphasises the importance of
socio-economic characteristics driving variations in vote share across parliamentary
constituencies; these literature-driven variables are the components within the X matrices in
equations (1) and (3). Then we augment this model with the queen contiguity variable using
spatial regression. Of note is whether the magnitude and significance of the socio-economic
variables change systematically once the geographical variable is included in the model and, of
course, whether the geographical variable is important itself. The third column presents re-
estimates of the first column using OLS methods but this time we include campaign spending
by each political party as additional explanatory variables. Finally we re-estimate this column
using spatial regression to include the geographical contiguity variable. In each case we
employ the queen contiguity weight matrix.
2005 party vote share appears to be influenced by a range of factors for each political party,
and this is in line with the literature review above. Of immediate interest are the changes in the
log-likelihoods. Large positive increases in log-likelihood values are apparent for all political
parties with the inclusion of the spending and/or spatial weights variable. The magnitude of
these changes in log-likelihood values is greatest for the Conservative party and smallest for
the Liberal Democrats, although this low value for the Liberal Democrats might be due to the
concentration of this party in the South West. Nevertheless, this alone indicates that the
inclusion of the spending and spatial weights variables drastically improves the predictive
power of the model for each political party.
As noted by previous studies (FIELDHOUSE et al., 2006), the Liberal Democrats obtained
higher vote shares in parliamentary constituencies which had higher proportions of students
and inhabitants with degrees. Areas with more inhabitants working in agriculture and with
more pensioners are also more likely to generate higher vote shares for the Liberal Democrats.
Of particular interest is whether the inclusion of campaign spending affects vote share. The
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results indicate that higher own party expenditures and lower campaign spending by the other
two political parties both increase a party’s vote share; this is consistent across all three parties.
However, the inclusion of the spending variables may well be correlated with the earlier
explanatory variables. The effect of campaign spending appears to dilute the socio-economic
controls, the educational control and the student control. Once we re-estimate the regressions
using spatial regression techniques, irrespective of whether we include campaign spending, we
find that the importance of the pensioners, agriculture, degrees, manufacturers and students has
been over-stated; out of these variables, only Degrees and Students remain statistically
significant at the traditional confidence levels. This implies that through the lack of
appreciation of spatial factors, or of the spatial autocorrelation of the explanatory variables
across space, other scholarly work may over-estimate the importance of these explanatory
variables. An additional observation is that the importance of large proportions of individuals
working in education only becomes an important explanatory variable for the Liberal
Democrats once the geographical weights matrix has been included in the econometric
analysis.
Supporting the proposition that the campaign spending variables may be correlated with the
other explanatory variables is the multicollinearity condition number. The values of this
statistic increase from below 4 to above 4 for all of the three political parties when campaign
spending alone is included in the model. Nevertheless the critical value for this statistic is
much larger than 4, which indicates that multicollinearity is probably not strongly influencing
the results.3
Our results suggest that the progressive reduction in the importance of the explanatory
variables is not systematically present for the Conservatives when we include these extra
explanatory variables of campaign spending and space. In addition to this observed stability we
find the spending variables and the spatial matrices remain important explanatory variables of
the Conservative party vote share. By contrast the regression results for the Labour party
illustrate that the inclusion of (either and both) campaign spending and the spatial weights
matrix do reduce the magnitude of several of the theoretical literature based explanatory
variables; in spite of this the majority of these variables remain statistically significant.
To summarise this section, the results of the 2005 vote share regressions suggest that i) space
and campaign spending are importance covariates in the modelling of political party vote share
across England and Wales; ii) the importance of education is over (under) stated for the Liberal
Democrats and Labour (Conservative) party vote shares before campaign spending and space
are included in the model; iii) all industry proxies appear to be overstated if space is omitted
from the model; iv) the effect of home ownership on vote share appears to be over-stated when
employing OLS methods, but nevertheless remains important when we use a spatial regression
3 According to Julia Koschinsky the condition number in GeoDa indicates that multicollinearity might be a
problem around a value of 30, so values below 30 are not suggestive of multicollinearity
(http://sal.uiuc.edu/pipermail/ openspace/2006-January/000676.html). However documentation from Brown
University (http://www.s4.brown.edu/S4/Training/Modul2/GeoDa3FINAL.pdf) indicates that one should be
alarmed when the multicollinearity condition number is greater than 20. In no instances in our results is this
the case.
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approach; and v) campaign spending is important even after spatial autocorrelation. In spite of
the observation that space is an important driver of party vote shares, the Breusch-Pagan test
statistic (not reported for brevity) consistently indicates that there is still heteroskedasticity in
the model even after introducing the spatial lag or spatial error terms. In each case the
likelihood ratio tests indicate that the spatial effects models are improvements over the
corresponding OLS models.
Assessing the improvement in the models
One method of identifying whether the performance of the model has improved through the
inclusion of the campaign spending variable and the use of spatial modelling is to examine the
predicted values. For brevity we compare the performance of the first and last regressions for
each political party with the actual spatial variation in vote share. LISA cluster maps of the
predicted values for the first sets of results – based on the theoretical model by FIELDHOUSE
et al., (2006) – are presented in Figures 13–15 and predicted values for the final sets of results
are presented in Figure 16–18. For comparison we present LISA cluster maps of the actual vote
share for each political party in 2005 in Figures 10 – 12.
{Insert Figures 10–18 about here}
The performance of the FIELDHOUSE et al. (2006) theoretical model for the Liberal
Democrats is shown in Figure 13. Areas of good predictive performance exist (such as the
South West), but so do areas of important inaccuracies (such as Wales but also for a large area
from Hull to Lancaster). Our augmentation of their model to include party spending and
estimated using spatial regression are presented in Figure 16. When our predicted values are
compared with the actual results there is a high level of similarity, and much smaller
inaccuracies in predictions. Our model correctly predicts much of the vote share in the South
West and does not over-predict the values for Wales or North Yorkshire. However there are
some inaccuracies in the West Midlands. We take the view that no model perfectly captures
reality, but it appears that the introduction of spending and spatial factors appear to have
greatly improved the model’s predictive capacity.
Although FIELDHOUSE et al. (2006) focused on the Liberal Democrats, we continue to use
their model to identify the predictive performance for the other two main political parties. For
the Conservative party, the actual vote share patterns are presented in Figure 11; their model’s
predictions are presented in Figure 14 and the pattern of predictions of their model with our
spending and spatial augmentations is presented in Figure 17. Our extensions of this model to
include space and political party spending have only a limited amount of success when it is
applied to the Conservative party. The extensions capture more of the spatial pattern around
Peterborough, Cambridge and Northampton but perform relatively poorly around Reading,
Oxford, Huddersfield and for whole swathes of Wales. Our conclusion from these maps is that
the incorporation of spatial and spending effects does not drastically improve a model which is
not necessarily geared around explaining Conservative party vote share – the underlying
theoretical model should be the correct one in the first instance.
In spite of the results of the model for the Conservative party, we reapply the FIELDHOUSE et
al. (2006) theoretical model to predict Labour party vote share. The results of their model
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predict the low vote share for much of the South West and the South Downs, and the high vote
shares in the urban centres of Liverpool, Manchester, Sheffield and Doncaster. However the
model under-predicts the vote share in parts of Wales and for a whole corridor of parliamentary
constituencies from Bridlington to Morecombe and, at the same time, over predicts vote share
along a corridor between Oxford and Southampton. When we introduce space and party
spending into the model we find a large improvement in the model. The model now appears to
accurately predict the Labour party vote shares for much of England and Wales with a few
exceptions, most notably the under prediction of the Labour party vote share between the Vale
of York to Morecombe and a few parliamentary constituencies in East Anglia.
Our analysis of the predicted residuals from the application of the augmented FIELDHOUSE
et al. (2006) model to all three major political parties illustrates that the incorporation of
spending and spatial effect into the model improves the model’s performance, although the
performance is particularly improved for the Liberal Democrats and the Labour parties and less
so for the Conservative party. It also illustrates that this FIELDHOUSE et al. model could be
applied to predict the Labour party vote share as well as the Liberal Democrats, as it was
originally proposed for. However this does lead us to question whether the spatial effects of the
explanatory variables vary between these political parties. For instance the spatial
heterogeneity of explanatory variables may well vary in importance for each political party.
Spatial autocorrelation of explanatory variables
It is important to identify the source of this spatial autocorrelation in the model. In an attempt
to identify whether the covariates are particularly influenced by space we estimate a further set
of three regressions. We are attempting to identify what factors affect party vote share so we
include the covariates discussed throughout as before but we also include compound variables
where the aforementioned covariates are multiplied by the queen weight matrix. Hence, we are
explicitly including both the traditional socio-economic explanatory variables of party vote
share along with the spatial autocorrelation of each explanatory variable. The results, generated
in STATA v9, are presented in Table 2.
{Insert Table 2 about here}
According to the log-likelihood test, the models for the Liberal Democrat and Labour parties
are improved through the inclusion of these extra compound explanatory covariates. This is not
the case for the regression of the Conservative party vote share. The results of the regression
for the Conservative party indicate that the non-compound variables remain at a similar
magnitude and statistical significance. Along with this covariate stability are indications that
space is still important; this can be identified through the Moran’s I (residuals) statistic and that
there appears to be an impact of spatial autocorrelation of the covariates, including the
campaign spending covariates. Such results indicate that there can be confidence that the socio-
economic covariates may be stable irrespective of the inclusion of spatial factors.
The most interesting set of results from this table is the analysis of Liberal Democrat support.
Once we take into consideration the impact of spatial autocorrelation through the socio-
economic explanatory variables, we come to the conclusion that space plays a vital role in the
Liberal Democrats’ electoral performance. It appears that the main factor behind Liberal
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Democrat support is party spending; this is the case for own party spending and for own party
spending with spatial autocorrelation. The magnitude of the coefficient for the Liberal
Democrat campaign spending variable is the largest of any political party. Here we can
conclude that local party activism, through the proxy party spending, is the most important
influence of Liberal Democrat vote share, once spatial variation has been taken into account.
Bearing in mind many, if not all, aggregate analyses of Liberal Democrat support have ignored
possible spatial effects, this finding strengthens recent scholarly evidence regarding the
importance of place based local activism on Liberal Democrat electoral performance
(RUSSELL and FIELDHOUSE, 2005; CUTTS, 2006a, 2006b)..
6. Conclusion
There is a growing body of literature which suggests that voting patterns are not independent
from space. Voting patterns can be spatially dependent because people interact with their
material environment (JOHNSTON and PATTIE, 2006). Although many studies indicate that
spatial factors might be influencing party vote shares, few empirical studies take explicit
account of spatial factors in their empirical analyses.
This paper has sought to take explicit account of spatial heterogeneity in vote share across
constituencies in England and Wales at the 2005 general election. Building on the theoretical
and empirical contributions in the literature to date, this paper integrates spatial autocorrelation
into the modelling analysis through the use of spatial regression. Our results indicate that the
importance of spatial autocorrelation varies for each political party. As shown by the
regression results, one of the major consequences of ignoring spatial effects is biased results,
with the determinants of party vote share being either over or under stated when space is
omitted from the analysis. Moreover, likelihood ratio tests confirm that the spatial effects
models are marked improvements on the original OLS models. Similarly, an examination of
predicted residuals for all the three parties reiterates the improvement in model performance
after taking account of spending and spatial effects.
Space is found to play a vital role in the Liberal Democrats’ electoral performance. It appears
that the main factor behind Liberal Democrat support is party spending; this is the case for own
party spending and for own party spending with spatial autocorrelation. This provides further
proof that intensive grassroots campaigning is particularly salient to the electoral fortunes of
the Liberal Democrats. This is in contrast to the drivers of the vote shares for the Conservative
party, which appears to be much less influenced by spatial factors, and for the Labour party,
where space plays an important but smaller effect. In summary, this paper provides a blueprint
for future aggregate analyses of party performance at the constituency level. It is clear that
future regression models of voting at the constituency scale must explicitly take account of
spatial heterogeneity in order to correctly identify the strength and importance of factors that
affect parties’ electoral performance.
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Figure 1: Moran’s I scatter plot of Liberal Democrats party performance in 2005
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Figure 2: Moran’s I scatter plot of Conservatives party performance in 2005
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Figure 3: Moran’s I scatter plot of Labour party performance in 2005
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Figure 4: Moran’s I scatter plot of Liberal Democrat party spending in 2005
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Figure 5: Moran’s I scatter plot of Conservative party spending in 2005
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Figure 6: Moran’s I scatter plot of Labour party spending in 2005
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Figure 7: LISA cluster map of Liberal Democratic Party spending
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Figure 8: LISA cluster map of Conservative Party spending
26
Figure 9: LISA cluster map of Labour Party spending
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Figure 10: LISA cluster map of Liberal Democrat actual values
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Figure 11: LISA cluster map of Conservative actual values
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Figure 12: LISA cluster map of Labour actual values
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Figure 13: LISA cluster map of Liberal Democrat predicted values based on the
FIELDHOUSE et al. (2006) model
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Figure 14: LISA cluster map of Conservative predicted values based on the
FIELDHOUSE et al. (2006) model
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Figure 15: LISA cluster map of Labour predicted values based on the FIELDHOUSE et
al. (2006) model
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Figure 16: LISA cluster map of Liberal Democrat predicted values based on final model
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Figure 17: LISA cluster map of Conservative predicted values based on final model
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Figure 18: LISA cluster map of Labour predicted values based on final model
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Table 1: Vote shares
Political party Liberal Democrats Conservatives Labour
Method of
Estimation OLS
Spatial
Lag OLS
Spatial
Lag OLS
Spatial
Error OLS
Spatial
Error OLS
Spatial
Error OLS
Spatial
Lag
Intercept -0.000(0.037)
0.001
(0.053)
0.000
(0.021)
0.000
(0.020)
-0.000
(0.027)
-0.070
(0.077)
0.000
(0.020)
-0.004
(0.058)
0.000
(0.026)
-0.002
(0.057)
0.000
(0.029)
0.026
(0.016)
Degrees 0.252**(0.054)
0.190**
(0.050)
0.073*
(0.032)
0.061*
(0.032)
0.358**
(0.039)
0.364**
(0.046)
0.198**
(0.033)
0.291**
(0.039)
-0.428**
(0.038)
-0.039**
(0.047)
-0.216**
(0.029)
-0.194**
(0.026)
Manufacturing -0.094(0.048)
-0.051
(0.045)
-0.017
(0.027)
-0.005
(0.027)
-0.183**
(0.035)
-0.143**
(0.041)
-0.147**
(0.027)
-0.135**
(0.034)
0.168**
(0.034)
0.126**
(0.052)
0.098**
(0.024)
0.072**
(0.021)
Agriculture 0.165**(0.044)
0.131**
(0.041)
0.025
(0.026)
0.021
(0.026)
0.180**
(0.032)
0.225**
(0.030)
0.051**
(0.026)
0.136**
(0.027)
-0.341**
(0.031)
-0.320**
(0.045)
-0.172**
(0.023)
-0.133**
(0.021)
Pensioners 0.194*(0.054)
0.134**
(0.050)
0.016
(0.031)
0.003
(0.030)
0.046
(0.039)
0.173**
(0.035)
0.027
(0.031)
0.146**
(0.030)
-0.197**
(0.038)
-0.193**
(0.038)
-0.081**
(0.027)
-0.070**
(0.024)
Students 0.174**(0.061)
0.157**
(0.056)
0.064
(0.034)
0.063
(0.033)
0.041
(0.044)
0.039
(0.032)
0.038
(0.034)
0.054*
(0.027)
-0.143**
(0.043)
-0.119**
(0.036)
-0.075**
(0.030)
-0.036
(0.027)
Muslims 0.008(0.046)
0.010
(0.043)
-0.030
(0..026)
-0.028
(0.025)
0.001
(0.033)
-0.037
(0.028)
0.007
(0.026)
-0.023
(0.024)
-0.112**
(0.033)
-0.068*
(0.031)
-0.094**
(0.023)
-0.095**
(0.020)
WorKING in education 0.072(0.053)
0.102*
(0.049)
0.053
(0.030)
0.064*
(0.030)
-0.278**
(0.039)
-0.244**
(0.036)
-0.188**
(0.030)
-0.196**
(0.030)
0.161**
(0.038)
0.102**
(0.038)
0.111**
(0.027)
0.041
(0.024)
Home ownership 0.023(0.051)
0.030
(0.048)
-0.017
(0.032)
-0.010
(0.031)
0.661**
(0.037)
0.445**
(0.036)
0.423**
(0.032)
0.362**
(0.031)
-0.507**
(0.037)
-0.369**
(0.039)
-0.324**
(0.028)
-0.266**
(0.025)
Lib Dem campaign spending – – 0.746**(0.024)
0.719**
(0.025) – –
-0.218**
(0.025)
-0.205**
(0.020) – –
-0.293**
(0.022)
-0.259**
(0.020)
Conservative campaign
spending – –
-0.135**
(0.027)
-0.135**
(0.027) – –
0.490**
(0.028)
0.292***
(0.024) – –
-0.251**
(0.024)
-0.158**
(0.022)
Labour campaign
Spending – –
-0.259**
(0.025)
-0.246**
(0.024) – –
-0.223**
(0.025)
-0.153**
(0.020) – –
0.298**
(0.022)
0.266**
(0.019)
Spatial error – – – – – 0.758**(0.032) –
0.725**
(0.034) –
0.637**
(0.041) – –
Spatial lag – 0.402**(0.050) –
0.140**
(0.036) – – – – – – –
0.323**
(0.028)
Moran’s I
(residuals) 0.223** – 0.063** – 0.500** – 0.366** – 0.418** – 0.294** –
Lagrange multiplier
diagnostic tests:
Spatial
Lag*** –
Spatial
Lag*** –
Spatial
Error** –
Spatial
Error** –
Spatial
Error*** –
Spatial
Lag*** –
Likelihood ratio test for
spatial weights matrix – 60.54** – 15.22** – 303.32** – 215.44** – 187.87** – 123.78**
F-statistic (prob.) 20.84*** – 159.37*** - 103.28*** – 157.31*** – 109.81** – 215.904 –
Log-likelihood -732.734 -702.464 -402.191 -394.58 -549.007 -397.347 -404.986 -297.267 -538.484 -444.548 -334.362 -272.472
R2 0.229 0.330 0.759 0.766 0.596 0.795 0.756 0.854 0.611 0.745 0.810 0.850
AIC 1483 1425 828 815 1116 812 833 618 1095 907 693 571
Multicollinearity condition
number 3.814 – 4.217 – 3.814 – 4.468 – 3.814 – 7.623 –
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Table 2: Spatial Models of 2005 Party Vote Share
Political party Liberal Democrats Conservative Labour
Intercept -0.004 (0.022) -0.002 (0.019) 0.010 (0.018)
Degrees 0.051 (0.059) 0.285** (0.053) -0.225** (0.048)
Manufacturing -0.028 (0.050) -0.112** (0.045) 0.041 (0.041)
Agriculture 0.038 (0.035) 0.134** (0.032) -0.207** (0.029)
Pensioners -0.027 (0.040) 0.161** (0.036) -0.121** (0.033)
Students 0.043 (0.037) 0.052 (0.033) -0.065* (0.030)
Muslims -0.045 (0.032) -0.013 (0.028) -0.055* (0.026)
WorKING in education 0.079 (0.043) -0.200** (0.039) 0.055 (0.035)
Home owner -0.039 (0.043) 0.310** (0.038) -0.239** (0.034)
Lib Dem campaign spending 0.721** (0.026) -0.207** (0.023) -0.283** (0.021)
Conservative campaign spending -0.142** (0.031) 0.352** (0.027) -0.133** (0.025)
Labour campaign spending -0.246** (0.026) -0.172** (0.023) 0.261** (0.021)
Degree * queen weight matrix 0.085 (0.077) -0.269** (0.069) 0.093 (0.062)
Manufacturing * queen weight matrix 0.026 (0.064) -0.046 (0.057) 0.072 (0.052)
Agriculture * queen weight matrix -0.059 (0.048) -0.194** (0.043) 0.107** (0.039)
Pensioners * queen weight matrix 0.120 (0.062) -0.276** (0.056) 0.063 (0.050)
Students * queen weight matrix -0.093 (0.081) -0.114 (0.072) 0.065 (0.066)
Muslims * queen weight matrix 0.086 (0.055) 0.056 (0.049) -0.150** (0.045)
WorKING in Education * queen weight matrix 0.027 (0.071) 0.099 (0.063) 0.004 (0.057)
Home owner * queen weight matrix 0.047 (0.067) 0.026 (0.059) -0.045 (0.054)
Lib Dem campaign spending * queen weight matrix 0.110* (0.049) -0.095* (0.044) 0.051 (0.039)
Conservative campaign spending * queen weight matrix -0.041 (0.052) 0.463** (0.046) -0.350** (0.042)
Labour campaign spending * queen weight matrix -0.025 (0.049) -0.220** (0.043) 0.190** (0.039)
Moran’s I (residuals) 0.050** 0.323** 0.241**
F-statistic (prob.) 81.790 108.93 138.81
Log-likelihood -392.194 -327.662 -270.301
R2 0.77 0.81 0.84
AIC 830 701 587
Multicollinearity condition number 11.564 11.564 11.564
Notes (for Tables 1 and 2): standard errors in parentheses; * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level
respectively; all continuous variables are standardised; queen contiguity weight matrices employed in non-OLS estimations; in
all cases lagrange multiplier test results are supported by robust LM test results; there are 569 observations in each regression.
